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The Rise of Is lamic Fun da men tal ism
and the Birth of Hamas
AITANA RADU
”Is lam, a dif fer ent civi li za tion whose peo ple are 
con vinced of the su pe ri or ity of their cul ture, and 
are ob sessed with the in fe ri or ity of their power“1
Sam uel HUNTINGTON
Among the most im por tant so cial and po liti cal changes that the Mid dle East 
has ex peri enced in the last cen tury, lays also the rise of Is lamic fun da men tal ism. In 
the af ter math of 9/11 and 11 March 2004 radi cal Is lam has be come a fo cus of aca-
demic con cern, not mainly as a re lig ion but as a con tender in world poli tics. As 
Daniel Phil pott ar gued ”radi cal Is lamic re viv al ism chal lenges the au thor ity struc-
tures of the in ter na tional sys tem”2. The rise of Islam ism is per ceived as an in di ca-
tor of a wider phe nome non of poli ti ci za tion of re lig ion. Ac cord ing to one im por tant 
scholar in the field we are now speak ing of a ”re turn of the sa cred” – a chal lenge is-
sued to the secu lar world view pro moted by West ern so cie ties3.
Un for tu nately for the aca demic field, the lit era ture on this topic is sparse and 
more than of ten strongly bi ased. Is lamic fun da men tal ism has been judged and 
con demned by many with out been given a proper trial. For ex am ple, a con sid er-
able num ber of Ameri can au thors have ad hered to the con vic tion that ”Is lamic 
fun da men tal ism is the great est threat to Ameri can se cu rity since Com mu nism“4, 
a state ment that leaves lit tle room for theo reti cal ar gu men ta tion. As is the case 
here, many have fallen into the trap of over sim pli fi ca tion be ing tempted to iden-
tify in Is lam a per ma nent en emy for the West. In ad di tion to this, many au thors en-
gage in ex ten sive ar gu men ta tion over the char ac ter of Is lamic fun da men tal ism 
with out pre vi ously tak ing the time to prop erly de fine their meth odo logi cal frame-
work. In many cases this has led to a con fu sion in con cepts, Is lam be ing equated 
with po liti cal Is lam which in turn is de fined as Is lamic fun da men tal ism.
The aim of this study is to build com pre hen sive defi ni tions for the main con-
cepts in volved in this de bate. More over, the ar ti cle ex plores some of the most fre-
quent mis con cep tions and preju dices as so ci ated to the study of po liti cal Is lam and 
Is lamic fun da men tal ism. In this re spect, I stress the im por tance of given Is lamic con-
cepts, the sig nifi cance at trib uted to them by the Mus lims, and as to coun ter bal ance 
1 Jost HALFMANN, ”Fundamentalist Terrorism – the Assault on the Symbols of Secular 
Power”, Institute of European Studies. Occasional Papers, Working Paper OP-2, April 2003, at http://
repositories.cdlib.org/ies/op/2 (accessed on 23.03.2007).
2 Daniel PHILPOTT, ”The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International 
Relations”, World Politics, vol. 55, no. 1, 2002, pp. 66-95/p. 67.
3 Bassam TIBI, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe. Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam versus 
Global Jihad, Routledge, London and New York, 2008, p. 15.
4 Jonathan R. WHITE, Terrorism, 4th edition and introduction, Thomson Wadsworth, 
Belmont, 2003, p. 153.
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the ten dency of many West ern au thors to trans late Is lamic ter mi nol ogy in uni ver sal 
terms and in ter pret Is lamic writ ings from a West ern per spec tives, which of ten leads 
to mis in ter pre ta tion. As Frederic Volpi no ticed in his study on po liti cal Is lam:
”While it is un de ni able that the is sues Is lamic fun da men tal ists deal with 
over lap the is sues that are im por tant for West ern po liti cal un der stand ing – 
and there fore they can be ap pre hended with simi lar con cep tual tools – they 
are not ar ticu lated and stra te gi cally im ple mented to con front the same prac-
ti cal di lem mas. Spe cific texts and ac tions are only fully mean ing ful in their 
own con text, and there is no guar an tee that what is fac tu ally ac cu rate in a 
par ticu lar his tori cal or geo graphi cal con text is rele vant to an other”1.
Tak ing into con sid era tion that for a com pre hen sive un der stand ing of the po-
liti cal life and state struc ture of the West ern world is needed first an un der stand-
ing and knowl edge of West ern po liti cal phi loso phy, my aim in this pa per is to 
of fer a simi lar kind of theo reti cal in sight into Is lamic po liti cal thought. To bet ter 
il lus trate my theo reti cal as ser tions I have cho sen to use as a study case the Is lamic 
Re sis tance Move ment – Hamas. There are sev eral rea sons be hind this de ci sion. 
First, Hamas is ac tive in the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries, a re gion hold ing pow er ful sym-
bolic sig nifi cances for the Mus lim popu la tion. As an Arab scholar stated ”the is-
sue of Pal es tine has be come the Mus lim griev ance by ex cel lence“2. Thus, Hamas’ 
ob jec tive of lib er at ing Pal es tine has a sa cred char ac ter that con veys le giti macy to 
the or gani za tion among the ma jor ity of the Arab peo ple.
Sec ond, I have cho sen Hamas as an ex am ple be cause of its trans for ma tion po-
ten tial. From its foun da tion, Hamas has been char ac ter ized by a dual struc ture, be-
ing both a mili tary and so cial or gani za tion. The in-built du al ity has en cour aged it 
in the last years to evolve from a tra di tional re sis tance move ment to wards a po liti-
cal party. This evo lu tion has been ac com pa nied at the ideo logi cal level by a grad-
ual re nun cia tion of the val ues of Islam ism in fa vor of a more secu lar ap proach, 
which makes Hamas a valu able case-study for this par ticu lar re search.
It is also im por tant to men tion here that Is lamic po liti cal thought, is not a 
clear cor pus of ideas but is com posed of the points of views of dif fer ent au thors, 
all con cerned with the prob lem of the re la tion be tween Is lam, state and so ci ety. 
This lack of co he sion is due to the fact that un til re cent years Is lamic schol ars were 
not con cerned with the elabo ra tion of a struc tured Is lamic phi loso phy of the state 
simi lar to its West ern coun ter part. It is clear that the his tori cal de vel op ment of 
states in the Mid dle East was much dif fer ent from that of the West, and be cause of 
that it took a longer time for Mid dle East ern schol ars to elabo rate such a po liti cal 
phi loso phy ap pli ca ble to the Mus lim-in hab ited re gions.
This lag ging be hind was also caused by the fact that Is lamic po liti cal thought 
is or gani cally con nected to the in ter pre ta tion of the Ko ran and of the writ ings of the 
prophet Mo ham med. In com pari son with the secu lari za tion of the West, in the Mus-
lim cul ture the con cepts of church and state can not be un der stood in di vidu ally3. 
1 Frederic VOLPI, ”Understanding the Rationale of the Islamic Fundamentalists’ Political 
Strategies: A Pragmatic Reading of their Conceptual Schemes during the Modern Era”, Totalitarian 
Movements and Political Religions, vol. 1, no. 3, Winter 2000, pp. 73-96/p. 74.
2 Mohammed AYOOB, ”Political Islam: Image and Reality”, World Policy Journal, Fall 2004, 
pp. 1-14/p. 11.
3 Manus I. MIDLARSKY, ”Democracy and Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict and the 
Democratic Peace”, International Studies Quaterly, vol. 42, no. 3, September 1998, pp. 485-511/p. 486.
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The fact that for a long time, the in ter pre ta tion of the Ko ran was the privi lege of Is-
lamic schol ars, also made it harder for such a po liti cal phi loso phy to be cre ated. 
How ever, the Is lamic re vival brought with it the af fir ma tion of the right of every 
Mus lim to in ter pret the Ko ran which led to the ap pear ance of many trends of in ter-
pre ta tion that united to gether started to form an Is lamic po liti cal thought1.
The schol ars of this do main can be di vided in two main cate go ries: the con ser-
va tive-radi cals and the mod er ates. An im por tant rep re sen ta tive of the con ser va-
tive-radi cals that I have men tioned re peat edly in many pa per is Sayyd Qutb, an 
Is lamic scholar that at tempted to pro vide a prac ti cal po liti cal phi loso phy to the 
socio-cul tural re vival led by the Mus lim Broth er hood or gani za tion in Egypt. 
Qutb’s main goal was that of de vis ing a prac ti cal con cep tual strat egy that would 
al low the true be liev ers (Mus lims) to con front a non Is lamic au thori tar ian state. In-
spir ing him self from the works of a pro-fas cist Euro pean thinker, Alexis Car rel, 
Qutb elabo rated his own critic of mod ern civi li za tion which took the form of a 
book called Mile stones2.
What makes Qutb a con ser va tive-radi cal is his cri tique of the po liti cal and eco-
nomic fail ures of both Mid dle East ern and West ern re gimes but also his moral in-
dict ment of the post-Enlight en ment po liti cal theo ries that ad vo cated the 
elimi na tion of the re li gious au thor ity from the po liti cal realm3. I have cho sen Qutb 
to rep re sent the po si tion of con ser va tive-radi cals in my pa per also due tot the fact 
that his works are filled with West ern ideas and con structs4, which makes it eas ier 
for the un der stand ing of his body of ideas and for the com pari son of his works 
with West ern phi loso phi cal writ ings on the same topic.
As an im por tant rep re sen ta tive of the mod er ate po si tion I have cho sen Mu-
ham mad Ab duh, a rec og nized Is lamic scholar. Ab duh was also con cerned with 
the rea sons be hind the West ern domi na tion over the Is lamic com mu nity and iden-
ti fied these rea sons in the sepa ra tion be tween the re li gious au thor ity and gov ern-
ment. How ever, in com pari son with Qutb’s re jec tion of West ern ra tion al ism, 
Ab duh saw in the adop tion of West ern ra tion al ist phi loso phy the most ef fi cient 
way of re vers ing the de cline of the Is lamic civi li za tion5. In his opin ion, there was 
no di rect con flict be tween the West and the Mid dle East as he be lieved that ”the 
cur rent West ern Civi li za tion was not merely in debted to the Is lamic Civi li za tion 
but was also one of its un ac know ledged in stances”6.
This sepa ra tion be tween the two types of theo ries within Is lamic po liti cal 
thought is es sen tial for my pa per as it helps me ex plain the dis tinc tion that ex-
ists among the dif fer ent Islamist or gani za tions. Al though both Ab duh and Qutb 
in flu enced the char ac ter taken by the vari ous Islamist or gani za tions their op pos-
ing per spec tives on Is lamic po liti cal thought were re flected also in the ideo-
logi cal plat forms of these or gani za tions. While Ab duh’s point of view is best 
re flected by the Mus lim Broth er hood in Egypt, Qutb’s writ ings are bet ter ex-
pressed by ter ror ist or gani za tions such as the Is lamic Ji had, Hez bol lah and to a 
cer tain de gree, Hamas.
1 Frederic VOLPI, ”Understanding the Rationale…cit.“, p. 78.
2 Ibidem, p. 81.
3 Roxanne L. EUBEN, ”Comparative Political Theory: An Islamic Fundamentalist Critique 
of Rationalism”, The Journal of Politics, vol. 59, no. 1, February 1997, pp. 28-55/p. 31.
4 Ibidem, p. 32.
5 Frederic VOLPI, ”Understanding the Rationale…cit.“, p. 77.
6 Ibidem.
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A Con cep tual Di lemma
Both the term ”fun da men tal ism” and ”Islamist” have been the ob ject of in-
tense con tro versy. The dis putes are mainly con cerned with the mean ing and ori gin 
of these phe nom ena. Schol ars like Nikki Ked die be lieve that the term ”fun da men-
tal ism” is too bi ased, and sug gested its re place ment with a more neu tral term 
”new re li gious poli tics”1.Al though Ked die does not of fer a clear defi ni tion for 
new re li gious poli tics, he men tions sev eral fea tures that cer tain ide olo gies must 
pos sess in or der to be in cluded in this cate gory2.
These fea tures in clude first an ap peal to a re in ter preted, ho moge nized re li-
gious tra di tion, seen as an an swer to solv ing prob lems caused by a secu lar power. 
Sec ondly, the move ments are popu list, aimed at gain ing po liti cal power in or der 
to trans form the gov ern ment on the ba sis of their re ligio poli ti cal pro gram. Thirdly, 
they gen er ally have so cial con ser va tive views3.
The dis pute con cern ing the term ”fun da men tal ism” is con nected with the fact 
that rep re sen ta tives of such move ments of ten use spe cial terms to de fine them selves 
as true be liev ers that help them sepa rate from the oth ers. In the case of the Mus lims, 
the term used in or der to iden tify those sup port ing po liti cal Is lam is Islamist4.
Al though there is no global defi ni tion for fun da men tal ism, there are how ever 
defi ni tions for the par ticu lar forms taken by fun da men tal ism. In the case of the 
Mus lim world, Islam ism is de fined by the po liti cal sci en tist Guil ian De noeux as
”a form of in stru men tali za tion of Is lam by in di vidu als, groups and or gani za-
tions that pur sue po liti cal ob jec tives. It pro vides po liti cal re sponses to to day’s 
so cie tal chal lenges by imag in ing a fu ture, the foun da tions for which rest on 
re ap pro pri ated, re in vented con cepts bor rowed from the Is lamic tra di tion”5.
On the other hand, Islamist move ments are de fined as ”so cial groups that 
seek to pre serve, change or cre ate norms in the name of an over all be lief sys tem”6. 
The mem bers of these groups are usu ally edu cated young ur ban peo ple whose 
sense of alien ation from the state, led them to in ter nal ize Is lam as a means of pro-
test and strug gle for change. Ad di tion ally, their self-edu ca tion in mat ter of be lief 
has led them to op pose cleri cal Is lam which is per ceived to sanc tify a type of doc-
ile sub mis sion to the gov ern ment. More over, their mod ern edu ca tion can be a 
cause for their will ing ness to use West ern tech no logi cal ad vances in their strug gle 
against West ern cul ture and its in flu ences in the Mus lim world7.
Nikki Ked die also iden ti fies sev eral global fac tors that have in flu enced the rise 
of re li gious fun da men tal ist move ments in the coun tries af fected by these changes.
1 In this paper I will use the term Islamism or political Islam instead of Islamic fundamentalism 
or new religious politics because this is the term generally used in the literature of this domain. 
2 Nikki R. KEDDIE, ”The New Religious Politics: Where, When and Why do ’Funda-
mentalisms’ Appear“, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 40, no. 4, October 1998, 
pp. 696-723/p. 697.
3 Ibidem.
4 Ibidem, p. 698.
5 Mohammed AYOOB, ”Political Islam...cit.”, p. 1.
6 Meir HATINA, Islam and Salvation in Palestine, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle 
Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2001, p. 13.
7 Ibidem.
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Firstly, the re cent de vel op ment of capi tal ism has led to dra matic ine quali ties 
in so ci ety. The in come dis tri bu tion gaps, the forced mi gra tion and job in se cu ri ties 
have led peo ple to ques tion their iden ti ties1.
Sec ondly, the eco nomic slow downs, stag na tion in se cu rity and in creas ing mi-
gra tion that char ac ter ize the Mid dle East have en cour aged popu lar dis con tent-
ment and the rise to power of right-wing popu list move ments2.
Thirdly, the change to wards lib er ali za tion in the status of women has in-
creased the num ber of con ser va tive mo ments that ide al ize the past struc ture of so-
ci ety. In ad di tion to this global cul tural ho mog eni za tion is per ceived as a nega tive 
proc ess which at tempts to force upon peo ple uni ver sal ist mod ern west ern val ues, 
while tra di tion is lost or de stroyed3.
Fur ther more, the in crease in power of secu lar gov ern ments com bined with 
their in abil ity of solv ing se ri ous prob lems within so ci ety has en cour aged re ligio-
poli ti cal move ments. Edu ca tion and ur ban growth help peo ple ar ticu late bet ter 
their dis con tent ment with the gov ern ment4.
Fi nally, im prove ments in health have led to sig nifi cant demo graphic in creases 
which have changed the popu la tion struc ture. The num ber of young peo ple is con-
tinu ously in creas ing and they are the cate gory most vul ner able to join ing fun da-
men tal ist move ments5.
From all the coun tries af fected by fun da men tal ist move ments, the Mus lim 
world is per haps the most rep re sen ta tive and the most ana lyzed. There are three 
ele ments that make Is lam par ticu larly vul ner able to such move ments. The first of 
these fac tors is the early ties be tween Is lam and poli tics, which have been pre-
served de spite the trend to wards the secu lari za tion of Mid dle East ern gov ern-
ments. These ties have been sup ported also by the fact that Is lamic in sti tu tions 
have a long tra di tion of con trol ling law, edu ca tion and so cial ser vices6.
The sec ond fac tor re fers to the fact that in the Mus lim world the op po si tion to 
ex ist ing gov ern ments has usu ally based its pro gram on re li gious ide olo gies7.
The last fac tor that makes Is lam very vul ner able to fun da men tal ism are the 
anti-West ern at ti tudes that char ac ter ize the en tire Mus lim world. These hos tile con-
tacts have origi nated mainly in the sup port given by the West to Is rael even from 
its ori gin and also in the long pe riod of West ern domi na tion through co lo ni al ism8.
Radi cal and Mod er ate Per spec tive on Po liti cal Is lam
There are three main mo ments that are con sid ered es sen tial for po liti cal Is-
lam: the foun da tion of the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood in 1928, the 1967 war 
and the 1979 Ira nian Revo lu tion9.
1 Nikki R. KEDDIE, ”The New Religious Politics...cit.“, p. 699.
2 Ibidem.
3 Ibidem, p. 700.
4 Ibidem.
5 Ibidem.
6 Ibidem, p. 712.
7 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem.
9 Ibidem, p. 713.
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The rise of Islam ism is a mod ern phe nome non, part of a wider re sur gence of re-
lig ion in the en tire Mus lim world. In ad di tion to the po liti cal and socio-eco nomic 
causes men tioned above, the Is lamic re vival has also been sup ported by the ap pear-
ance of sev eral char is matic lead ers like Aya tol lah Khomeini and Sheikh Yas sin1.
The re vival of Is lam as a po liti cal and cul tural force has been a con sid era bly 
rapid phe nome non, as even the secu lar po liti cal dis courses in the Arab world 
made use con stantly of Is lamic sym bols and ideas. Po liti cal Is lam was also en cour-
aged both by the tol er ant poli cies of the Egyp tian Presi dent, An war Sa dat to wards 
the Mus lim Broth er hood and by Saudi fi nan cial aid for the in sti tu tion ali za tion of 
com mu nal Is lamic ac tivi ties2.
There are cer tain as sump tions about po liti cal Is lam that must be de con-
structed be fore start ing the analy sis on the ideo logi cal es sence of Islam ism and of 
the shapes it takes in the po liti cal arena. These three as sump tions are: po liti cal Is-
lam, like Is lam it self is mono lithic, po liti cal Is lam is by its na ture vio lent and the 
close con nec tion be tween poli tics and re lig ion is char ac ter is tic only to Is lam3.
In re al ity, Islamist move ments are quite dif fer ent be cause of the con text in 
which they op er ate and the means used in or der to achieve their goals. Al though 
the Is lamic vo cabu lary is com mon to all, each move ment uses it dif fer ently in or-
der to le giti mize its ac tions4. This point of view is sup ported by the an thro polo gist 
Dale Eick el man and the po liti cal sci en tist James Pis ca tori who stated that
”poli tics be come ’Mus lim’ by the in vo ca tion of ideas and sym bols, which 
Mus lim in dif fer ent con texts iden tify as ’Is lamic’ in sup port of… or gan ized 
claims and coun ter claims”5.
How ever, most Islamist move ments are united in their goals of Islam iz ing the 
so cial and po liti cal sys tem of their re spec tive so cie ties and of es tab lish ing a re-
vived au then tic world-wide Is lamic state based on Shari’a6.
The sec ond mis con cep tion about po liti cal Is lam is that it is in her ently vio lent. 
This mis con cep tion ap peared as a re sult of the im por tance given to vio lent ji hadi 
groups in many stud ies con cern ing Islamist move ments7.
How ever, there are many im por tant Islamist move ments that have not re-
sorted nec es sar ily to vio lent ji had in or der to achieve their aims. An ex am ple for 
this situa tion is the Mus lim Broth er hood in Egypt who worked both within the 
Egyp tian po liti cal sys tem and around it. Al though the Broth er hood has un der-
gone long pe ri ods of be ing of fi cially banned in Egypt it has pro moted many can di-
dates to the par lia men tary elec tions ei ther as in de pend ents or un der the ban ner of 
other par ties. The Broth er hood was many times criti cized by its more radi cal ele-
ments for adopt ing a non-vio lent tac tic in what con cerned the is sue of Pal es tine8. 
1 David ZEIDAN, ”The Islamic Fundamentalism View of Life as a Perennial Battle”, Middle 
East Review of International Affairs, vol. 5, no. 4, December 2001, pp. 26-53/p. 26.
2 Shaul MISHAL, Avraham SELA, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1999, p. 12.
3 Mohammed AYOOB, ”Political Islam...cit.”, p. 1.
4 Ibidem.
5 Ibidem, p. 2.
6 David ZEIDAN, ”The Islamic Fundamentalism View of Life…cit.”, p. 26.
7 Mohammed AYOOB, ”Political Islam...cit.”, p. 2.
8 Ibidem, p. 5.
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This led to the sepa ra tion of cer tain radi cal groups from the Broth er hood like the 
Is lamic Ji had and even tu ally Hamas.
In fact there are two main trends that can be iden ti fied in con tem po rary po liti-
cal Is lam. One pole of po liti cal Is lam is revo lu tion ary, stat ing that so ci ety must be 
”Islam ized” through the sei zure of power, le gally or vio lently, af ter which the 
state ma chin ery is used to re-Islam ize the so ci ety from above like in Iran. The 
other trend is the re form ist one, ac cord ing to which the birth of an Is lamic state is 
the re sult of a con tinu ous, in cre mental proc ess of Islami za tion, achieved mainly 
through edu ca tion and so cial ac tion from the bot tom up. This trend is rep re sented, 
as men tioned above, by the Mus lim Broth er hood in Egypt1.
The last sup po si tion gen er ally made about po liti cal Is lam is re lated to the fact 
that the in ter min gling of re lig ion and poli tics is unique to Is lam. This as sump tion 
has been sup ported by the fact that Mus lim lead ers main tained the fic tion of the in-
di visi bil ity be tween state and re lig ion mainly in or der to le giti mize dy nas tic rule 
and ab so lut ist pow ers for the sov er eign2.
In or der to un der stand fully Islam ism, one must ad dress first the writ ing of 
sev eral im por tant Islamist ideo logues like Mohammad Ab duh and Say yid Qutb.
Mohammad Ab duh, a rec og nized Is lamic scholar from the end of the 19th cen-
tury, at tempted to recon cep tu al ize both the re la tion ship be tween Is lam and the 
West and that be tween re lig ion and poli tics3. In do ing this, Ab duh was deeply in-
flu enced by the French his to rian, phi loso pher and poli ti cian Fran cois Guizot’ 
book The His tory of Civi li za tion in Europe4.
He be gan to study the de cline of the Is lamic civi li za tion and iden ti fied cer tain 
causes for its cur rent pre dica ment. Ab duh saw the de cline of Is lamic civi li za tion 
as be ing caused by the lack of ”enlight ened” gov ern ance and by the sepa ra tion be-
tween po liti cal lead ers and re li gious think ers5. Ac cord ing to him ”the dis so lu tion 
and the weak en ing of the bonds fas ten ing the Is lamic com mu nity be gan when the 
ti tle of alim be came dis tinct from the ti tle of Ca liph”6.
In ref er ence to the Euro pean civi li za tion, Ab duh be lieved that the West and Is-
lam rep re sent not an tago nis tic forms of so cial or der but varia tions upon a com mon 
theme. More over, he be lieved that the Is lamic world should adopt the kind of ra-
tion al ist phi loso phy used by the West ern civi li za tions in or der to stop its de cline7.
In or der to re form the Is lamic so ci ety on a more ra tion al ist ba sis, Ab duh sup-
ported the pro ject of a criti cal re-evalua tion of a large num ber of Is lamic tra di tions 
which were con sid ered to be of doubt ful ori gin or co her ence, but were none the-
less widely prac ticed8.
Al though the path opened by Ab duh in tro duced some revo lu tion ary ideas in 
the field of Is lamic stud ies, the real con se quences of his re for mu la tion of Is lamic 
stud ies be came clear only af ter his death, through the works of his dis ci ple Ra chid 
Rida9. In or der to avoid a po ten tial harm ing re-evalua tion of the Is lamic cor pus by 
1 Shaul MISHAL, Avraham SELA, The Palestinian Hamas…cit., p. 12.
2 Mohammed AYOOB, ”Political Islam...cit.”, p. 9.
3 Frederic VOLPI, ”Understanding the Rationale…cit.“, p. 74.
4 Ibidem, p. 76.
5 Ibidem, p. 77.
6 Ibidem.
7 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem, p. 78.
9 Ibidem.
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each new gen era tion of schol ars, Rida em pha sizes the im por tance and pri macy of 
the texts and tra di tions dat ing back to the Prophet and the four ”rightly guided” Ca-
liphs. The tra di tions stated in these works would be the main stan dard by which to 
judge all sub se quent Is lamic prac tices and in ter pre ta tions. This con ser va tive ideo-
logi cal trend started by Rida took the name of the Sala fi yya (the way of the an ces-
tors). Al though the Sala fi yya was im por tant as an ideo logi cal trend, it achieved its 
peak once it was ap plied in the po liti cal arena by the Mus lim Broth er hood1.
In ad di tion to the re forms brought on by Mohammad Ab duh and Ra chid Rida, 
came the works of Sayyd Qutb, who also aimed at re-ar ticu lat ing the themes of the 
Sala fi yya. Qutb’s chal lenge was to try to pro vide a prac ti cal po liti cal phi loso phy to 
the socio-cul tural re vival led by the Mus lim Broth er hood. Us ing Ab duh’s and Rida’s 
method of in ter pre ta tion the Ko ran, Qutb tried to de velop a prac ti cal con cep tual 
strat egy that al lowed the Faith ful to con front a non-Is lamic au thori tar ian state2.
From the vari ous works writ ten by Qutb, the most in flu en tial re mains Ma’alim 
fi-l Tariq (Mile stones), which is con sid ered to be a mani festo for the Sunni Is lamic 
Move ment. The book be gins with a char ac teri za tion of mod er nity as be ing a con di-
tion of ja hili yya. Ja hili yya is a con cept taken from Ko ran which re fers to a pe riod of 
ig no rance in Ara bia prior to the Reve la tion. Qutb uses in his book the term ja hili yya 
to de fine a state of ig no rance into which a so ci ety de scends when it de vi ated from 
the Is lamic way. There fore, the ja hili so ci ety is one that re fuses to sub mit to Al lah’s 
sov er eignty3.
The only civi lized com mu nity, from Qutb’s point of view, is the moral one, 
the only real free dom is moral free dom and the only true jus tice is Is lamic jus tice. 
From these ideas Qutb de rives the con clu sion that the he gem ony of the West ern 
world has ended, as the Enlight en ment has proven in ca pa ble of pro mot ing real 
pro gress, which is moral pro gress4.
Be cause of this in abil ity of pro mot ing real val ues, so cie ties are, ac cord ing to 
Qutb, ”stand ing on the brink of an abyss”5. This threat does not only re fer to the 
West but also to the so cie ties that claim to be Is lamic. For him, when Mus lim strug-
gle to imi tate alien mod els, they in evi ta bly rep li cate the ills of the West ern so ci ety 
in the Is lamic world. Qutb con sid ers all Is lamic so cie ties to be ja hili for as long as 
the lead ers con tinue to rep li cate West ern mod els and fail to un der stand the im por-
tance of Is lam in poli tics6.
Qutb be lieves that there is only one ver sion of Is lam, which can be found in 
the ac tions of the prophet Mu ham mad. In ad di tion he states that the origi nal Is-
lamic umma (com mu nity) is not an un at tain able ideal, but it can be ac com plished 
once all Mus lims find the nec es sary knowl edge and path. This just Is lamic com mu-
nity should be grounded in the be lief in the unity (tawid) and sole au thor ity of God 
which is ex pressed in the proc la ma tion: ”La ilaha illa All lah” (There is no God but 
Al lah)7. More over, the ex is tence of the umma is a pre req ui site to the use of the Ko-
ran as a po liti cal model. Ac cord ing to one Islamist thinker:
1 Ibidem, p. 79.
2 Ibidem, p. 81.
3 Roxanne L. EUBEN, ”Comparative Political Theory…cit.”, p. 34.
4 Ibidem, p. 35.
5 Ibidem, p. 36.
6 Ibidem.
7 Ibidem, p. 37.
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”the dif fi culty of cre at ing a po liti cal sys tem based on the Quran in the ab-
sence of a ho moge nous Mus lim na tion leads to a con tra dic tion be tween the 
Um mah as a re li gious com mu nity and the state as a sys tem of gov ern ment 
that ca ters for Mus lims and non-Mus lims alike”1.
The sub mis sion to the will of Al lah is ac com plished, ac cord ing to Qutb through 
the es tab lish ment of the Shari’a (Is lamic law) as the sole source of leg is la tion for all as-
pects of hu man life. The way to ward trans form ing mod ern so cie ties into a real umma 
is com posed of in di vid ual paths. Once the in di vid ual has over come the alien ation 
that char ac ter izes the ja hili yya, the mile stones are clearly marked, lead ing the in di vid-
ual to suc cess2. Islam ism, gen er ally stresses the im por tance of in di vid ual re spon si bil-
ity and the im por tance of the in ner bat tle within each be liever against sin3.
How ever, the most im por tant part of Qutb’s writ ings for the topic of this pa-
per is the one that deals with the is sue of ji had. In Qutb’s opin ion, it is not only nec-
es sary for Mus lims to im ple ment Is lam within their own lives, but they also must 
strive to de stroy ja hili yya when ever it ap pears in the world. The path to wards this 
ac tion is the ji had4.
Ji had is a Koranic term that for many years has fallen into dis use be fore re ap-
pear ing in the works of Is lamic schol ars like Qutb who gave it a more radi cal in ter-
pre ta tion. The word ji had comes from the verb ja hada and it means ”a de ter mined 
ef fort” di rected at an aim that is in di rect ac cor dance with God’s com mand and for 
the sake of Is lam and the Mus lim umma5. For Qutb, how ever, ji had is a lib er at ing 
force that sets hu mans free by bring ing about the King dom of God on earth. Qutb 
also gives ji had a new field of ap pli ca tion for while in the past it was used only in con-
nec tion to the re la tion ships be tween Mus lims and in fi dels, in Qutb’s writ ings ji had 
is to be used also in the re la tions be tween true Mus lims and so-called Mus lims6.
It is im por tant to note that in the Is lamic tra di tion, ji had is a com plex con cept that 
has two sepa rate but re lated mean ings. There is a greater ji had and a lesser ji had. The 
greater ji had is the moral strug gle that takes place within the soul of every be liever, a 
strug gle de signed to har mo nize man with Al lah’s moral stan dards as they are re-
vealed in the Shari’a. The lesser ji had is the vio lent one con ducted by the sword7.
Gen er ally speak ing, for Qutb ji had is the means to eradi cate a ja hili so ci ety in 
fa vour of an Is lamic so ci ety that ex er cises sov er eignty in the name of Al lah by ap-
ply ing the pre scrip tions pro claimed in the Ko ran and Hadith. Qutb jus ti fies the 
use of vio lence by claim ing that co er cion is le giti mate when it is done in the pur-
suit of free dom from slav ery8. Free dom, for Qutb has a spe cial mean ing, that of 
equal ity in sub mis sion. He dis tin guishes be tween ser vi tude and slav ery by stating 
1 Niels KASTFELT (ed.), ”Scriptural Politics – The Bible and the Koran as Political Models in 
the Middle East and Africa”, C. Hurst & Company Ltd., London, 2003, p. 117, in Dan STOENESCU, 
”The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Road Towards the Ummah”, Studia Politica. Romanian 
Political Science Review, vol. VIII, no. 3, 2008, p. 678.
2 Roxanne L. EUBEN, ”Comparative Political Theory…cit.”, p. 42.
3 David ZEIDAN, ”The Islamic Fundamentalism View of Life…cit.”, p. 30.
4 Roxanne L. EUBEN, ”Comparative Political Theory…cit.”, p. 43.
5 Assaf MOGHADAM, ”The Shi’i Perception of Jihad”, al Nakhlah – The Fletcher School Online 
Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilisation, Fall 2003, at http://fletcher.tufts.
edu/al_nakhlah/archives/fall2003/moghadam.pdf (accessed on 21.03.2007).
6 Roxanne L. EUBEN, ”Comparative Political Theory…cit.”, p. 43.
7 Assaf MOGHADAM, ”The Shi’i Perception…cit.”. 
8 Roxanne L. EUBEN, ”Comparative Political Theory…cit.”, p. 43.
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that ser vi tude be comes slav ery only when it is done in front of men and not in 
front of Al lah1.
While in tra di tional Is lam, ji had could be de clared only af ter long de lib era-
tions by the com pe tent ulama (Is lamic re li gious au thori ties), Islamists have trans-
formed ji had into a popu lar and ef fec tive tool against all ene mies of the Is lamic 
state, thus giv ing all lead ers the power to de clare ji had2.
The con cept of ji had has been used by many Islamist theo re ti cians, each one 
bring ing the con cept one step closer to its most vio lent form as it is used nowa days. 
Such a theo re ti cian was Hasan al-Banna, a found ing leader of the Mus lim Broth er-
hood in Egypt who be lieved that it is not spiri tual ji had which is the high est form 
of bat tle but the ac tive de fen sive ji had3.
The next step in the re-con cep tu ali za tion of the term ji had was taken by Qutb, 
who, as men tioned above, con sid ered ji had both a de fen sive and of fen sive tool 
used in the fight against ja hili yya. Qutb’s per cep tion of ji had was taken one step fur-
ther by Faraj of al-Ji had who viewed ac tive ji had as God’s so lu tion to the prob lem 
of deal ing with apos tate rul ers. Fur ther more, Faraj be lieved that vio lent ji had 
against all un be liev ers is, in fact, the sup pressed sixth pil lar of Is lam4.
Ab dul lah Az zam, a Pal es tin ian ji had fighter in Af ghani stan, fol lowed Faraj’ 
the ory claim ing that when kuf far (he reti cal forces) oc cupy Mus lim land, ji had be-
comes a com pul sory in di vid ual ob li ga tion on every sin gle Mus lim and re mains so 
un til the lib era tion of the last oc cu pied piece of Mus lim land5.
This evo lu tion of the con cept of ji had is vi tal for the un der stand ing of the evo-
lu tion of po liti cal Is lam in gen eral. The tran si tion from the mod er ate mean ings of 
ji had to wards the more radi cal forms can be seen also in the tran si tion from the 
mod er ate phi loso phy put forth in the early stages of the Mus lim Broth er hood in 
Egypt to the more vio lent phi loso phy adopted by the Broth er hood’s Pal es tin ian 
wing – Hamas.
The Im por tance of the Mus lim Broth er hood
and the Birth of Hamas
The Mus lim Broth er hood is one of the most im por tant Islamist or gani za tion. 
It was founded in 1928 in Egypt by Has san al-Banna and turned into a po liti cal or-
gani za tion in 1939. The Broth er hood has gen er ally adopted a peace ful way of re-
form ing the Is lamic so ci ety, con cen trat ing on so cial and moral as pects. In Has san 
al-Banna’s own words the Mus lim Broth er hood is
”a sala fiya mes sage, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a po liti cal or gani za tion, an 
ath letic group, a sci en tific and cul tural un ion, an eco nomic en ter prise and a 
so cial idea”6.
1 Ibidem, p. 39.
2 David ZEIDAN, ”The Islamic Fundamentalism View of Life…cit.”, p. 41.
3 Ibidem, p. 42.
4 Ibidem, p. 43.
5 Ibidem.
6 http://lexicorient.com/e.o/mus_br_egypt.htm (accessed on 21.03.2007).
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The Mus lim Broth er hood re jects both the secu lar ism of mod ern Is lamic na-
tions and West ern in flu ences, call ing in the same time for a re turn to the teach ings 
of the Ko ran. The or gani za tion’s motto is:
”Al lah is our ob jec tive. The Prophet is our leader. Qur’an is our law. Ji-
had is our way. Dy ing in the way of Al lah is our high est hope”1.
De spite sanc tion ing the method of vio lent ji had and in volv ing di rectly in most 
Mid dle East ern con flicts, the Mus lim Broth er hood is con sid ered to be one of the most 
mod er ate Islamist or gani za tions due to its con stant par tici pa tion in elec tions both in 
Egypt and in other Is lamic coun tries. While the or gani za tion has branches in 70 coun-
tries, it plays dif fer ent roles in each of these states. The branch ana lyzed in this pa per 
is the Pal es tin ian branch which gradu ally trans formed into an autono mous or gani za-
tion un der the name of Hara kat al-Mu qawa mah al-Islami yya (Hamas)2.
Pal es tin ian po liti cal Is lam ap peared later than other Islamist move ments in 
the Mid dle East, ac quir ing its fi nal shape at the be gin ning of the First In ti fada in 
1987. How ever, its ori gins can be found in the re birth of po liti cal Is lam in the early 
1970s and in the Ira nian Revo lu tion of 19793.
The Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries ex peri enced a radi cal ideo logi cal shift af ter the 
1967 war, when the fo cus on the strug gle from the ex ter nal arena (against for eign-
ers and the Is raeli state) shifted to a fo cus on the in ter nal arena (against the rul ing 
elite). It was be lieved that the Pal es tin ian strug gle could only be suc cess ful if all 
the secu lar Arab re gimes were elimi nated4.
Still, in the be gin ning this re ori en ta tion to wards a more vio lent ap proach was 
con fined only to a lim ited au di ence in the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries. While Is lamic 
radi cals in the Arab states dis tanced them selves from the strug gle against Is rael 
post pon ing it to a dis tant fu ture, the radi cal move ment in Pal es tine be lieved that 
the ji had against Is raeli is im mi nent. Among the ear lier sup port ers of im me di ate ji-
had were Sheikh As’ ad Bay yud al-Tamimi of Heb ron, an imam of the al-Aqsa 
Mosque ex pelled to Jor dan in 1967 and Sheikh Ya’qub Qarsh, also ex pelled to Jor-
dan in 19795.
How ever, start ing with the 1970’s the Is lamic radi cals in the Pal es tin ian ter ri-
to ries lost grounds due to two very im por tant fac tors. One of them was the emer-
gence of the Pal es tin ian Lib era tion Or gani za tion (PLO), a secu lar move ment, 
which took upon it self the re spon si bil ity of con duct ing armed strug gle against Is-
rael. Al though, the PLO’s dis course con tained Is lamic sym bols, these were only 
used in or der to at tract mass sup port for the move ment6.
The sec ond im por tant fac tor was the grow ing in flu ence of the Mus lim Broth er-
hood in the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries start ing with 1967. As men tioned above, the 
Mus lim Broth ers had a re form ist ap proach to the idea of es tab lish ing an Is lamic 
state, and they ap plied this ide ol ogy to the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries. They were 
par tially sup ported in their en deav our by the Is raeli Civil Ad mini stra tion who 
1 http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/source/Terrorism/muslimbrotherhood.html (accessed on 
21.03.2007).
2 Ibidem.
3 Ibidem.
4 Meir HATINA, Islam and Salvation…cit, p. 17.
5 Ibidem, p. 1.
6 Ibidem, p. 18.
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per ceived the Broth ers as a pos si ble means of un der min ing the in flu ence of the 
PLO amidst the Pal es tin ian popu la tion1.
The Broth er hood was rep re sented in the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries through three 
main bod ies that con sti tuted the base for the later for ma tion of Hamas. These bod-
ies were: the Is lamic Cen tre (al-Mu jamma’ al-Islami), the Is lamic As so cia tion 
(al-Jam’iyya al-Islami yya) and the Is lamic Uni ver sity. The spiri tual leader of the 
Is lamic Cen tre was Sheikh Ah med Yas sin, who later on be came the spiri tual 
leader of Hamas2.
All three or gani za tions were con structed around the re form ist ap proach of 
the Broth er hood. They were de signed to re form Pal es tin ian so ci ety in or der to pre-
pare the new gen era tions for the fu ture ji had against the state of Is rael. This is why 
the mem bers of these or gani za tions re strained from per form ing anti-Is raeli ac tivi-
ties and in stead con cen trated their ef fort to ward dele giti miz ing the PLO3.
How ever, start ing with the 1970’s a se ries of his tori cal events paved the way 
for the rise of mili tant Is lam and for the ap pear ance of a con sid er able num ber of 
Islamist or gani za tions in the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries. The first of these events was 
the fail ure of mul ti ple di verse ini tia tive, both Pal es tin ian and in ter na tional, of end-
ing the Is raeli oc cu pa tion. The sec ond was the re sur gence of re lig ion in the Mid dle 
East, ex pressed in the in tel lec tual field through the works of Qutb and other 
Islamic think ers and in the po liti cal arena through the Ira nian Revo lu tion, the 
assas si na tion of Egyp tian Presi dent, An war Sa dat and the guer rilla at tacks by 
the Shi’i mi li tias in Leba non against the Is raeli and US ar mies. In the so cie tal field, 
this re li gious re sur gence was ex pressed through the in creas ing num ber of mosques 
and chari ta ble as so cia tions in the en tire Mid dle East ern re gion4. Thus, in the pe-
riod be tween 1967 up to 1987, the num ber of mosques in the West Bank rose from 
400 to 750 and in the Gaza Strip from 200 to 6005.
The third event was re lated to the in ter nal schism ex is tent in the Arab world 
and within PLO in the wake of the Leba nese war. The mod era tion of PLO’s poli-
cies through the avoid ance of di rect con fron ta tion with Is rael was deeply criti-
cized by the Pal es tin ian peo ple6.
The fourth fac tor which sup ported the rise of mili tant Is lam was the ex pan-
sion of sec on dary and higher edu ca tion in the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries, along side 
with a wors en ing of eco nomic con di tions, es pe cially in the Gaza Strip. The dire 
con di tions in the refu gee camps fu elled a cli mate of re li gious fer vour among the 
edu cated youth. An analy sis of the ages, edu ca tion and so cial ori gin of the 415 
Hamas and Is lamic Ji had lead ers ex pelled to Leba non in 1992 re veals that 86.5% 
were young (20 to 30 years old), 32% were stu dents, school teach ers and pro fes-
sion als and 53% were resi dents of refu gee camps and vil lages7.
The last event was the pas sive stance of the Mus lim Broth er hood on the is-
sue of armed strug gle against Is rael. Many of the younger mem bers of the Broth-
er hood wanted a more di rect in volve ment in armed strug gle, es pe cially in the 
1 Ibidem, p. 19.
2 Ibidem.
3 Ibidem.
4 Ibidem, p. 20.
5 Ziad ABU-AMR, ”Hamas: A Historical and Political Background”, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, XXII, no. 4, Summer 1993, pp. 5-19/p. 8.
6 Meir HATINA, Islam and Salvation…cit., p. 20.
7 Ibidem, p. 21.
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case of the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries. This dis con tent ment led to the sepa ra tion of the 
more radi cal fac tions like the Is lamic Ji had from the main body of the Mus lim 
Broth er hood1.
Hamas was formed on De cem ber, 8th 1987, in the be gin ning of the in ti fada, as 
the Pal es tin ian branch of the Mus lim Broth er hood. In a way the out break of the in-
ti fada and the ap pear ance of Hamas were the con se quences of two dif fer ent but 
par al lel changes that were tak ing place in the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries at the time. 
While the first event re flected the gen eral Pal es tin ian mood to wards the fail ure of 
all strug gle against Is rael, the sec ond event rep re sented the in creas ing con scious-
ness of re sis tance and con fron ta tion among Pal es tin ian Islamists2.
The es tab lish ment of Hamas, which means zeal in Ara bic, be ing an ac ro nym 
for Hara kat al-Mu qawama al-Islami yya (The Is lamic Re sis tance Move ment) was 
not a clear-cut de ci sions but it evolved over time as a re sponse to the events that 
led to the out break of the in ti fada3. As men tioned above, there were a large num ber 
of young mem bers of the Mus lim Broth er hood who de manded a more ac tive par-
tici pa tion of the or gani za tion in the Pal es tin ian strug gle against the Is raeli oc cu pa-
tion4. The ques tion of whether to par tici pate di rectly or not in the in ti fada led the 
lead ers of the Mus lim Broth er hood into an ideo logi cal di lemma. A di rect par tici pa-
tion in the armed strug gle would have come against the long de clared aims of the 
or gani za tion of re form ing first the so ci ety be fore en ter ing ac tual fight ing. On the 
other hand, a pas sive stance would have made the or gani za tion lose even more 
sup port ers in the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries, which would have fur ther weak ened an 
al ready shaky pres ence of the Broth er hood there5.
At that point, the spiri tual leader of the Is lamic cen tre, Sheikh Ah med Yas sin 
pro posed a com pro mise so lu tion, which was the crea tion of a sepa rate or gani za-
tion out of the Mus lim Broth er hood to take re spon si bil ity for its par tici pa tion in the 
in ti fada. Thus, in the case the in ti fada failed, the Mus lim Broth er hood could shed 
all the blame on Hamas, and thus es cape pos si ble Is raeli re per cus sions6.
How ever, through its ac tive par tici pa tion in the in ti fada and the grow ing 
aware ness of its re la tion ship with the Broth er hood, Hamas man aged to put an 
end to the PLO’s crit ics con cern ing the non par tici pa tion of the Mus lim Broth er-
hood in the armed strug gle. From that point on, Yas sin and other Mus lim Broth er-
hood lead ers be gan to ad mit openly the con nec tion be tween Hamas and the 
Broth er hood, for ward ing the idea the Hamas is noth ing but a re formed ac tive 
wing of the Pal es tin ian branch of the Mus lim Breth ren7.
Hamas’ ideo logi cal plat form is best re flected in its Char ter which was is sued 
on Au gust, 18th 1988. At the be gin ning of this char ter Hamas de fined it self as a 
”Pal es tin ian branch of the Mus lim Broth er hood” and the gen eral con tent of the 
Cove nant does not dif fer much from po si tions taken by the Mus lim Broth er hood 
on the same is sues. How ever, it is clear even from the be gin ning that unlike the 
1 Ibidem.
2 Khaled HROUB, Hamas. Political Though and Pratice, Institute for Palestine Studies, 
Washington DC, 2000, p. 36.
3 Aitana RADU, ”Hamas: Combinaţie explozivă între naţionalismul palestinian şi funda-
mentalismul islamic”, Revista Institutului Diplomatic Român, no.1, 2006, pp. 63-65/p. 65.
4 Ziad ABU-AMR, ”Hamas…cit.”, p. 11.
5 Ibidem, p. 11
6 Ibidem.
7 Ibidem, p. 12.
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Broth er hood, Hamas’ main aim is not the ref or ma tion of so ci ety but the lib era tion 
of Pal es tine through vio lent ji had1.
In the char ter, the re li gious dis course is domi nant. In what con cerns Pal es tine 
the docu ment states that
”the land of Pal es tine is an Is lamic trust (waaf) upon all Mus lim gen era tions un til 
the Day of Res ur rec tion. It is not right to give it up nor any par of it” (art 11)2.
The so lu tion to this prob lem is, ac cord ing to Hamas, the re sort to vio lent ji had. 
Ji had, as set forth in the char ter is de signed to pre vent in fi dels from rul ing over the 
land of Is lam3.
In what con cerns peace ne go tia tions and ini tia tives, the char ter clearly states:
”What are called ’peace ful so lu tions’ and ’in ter na tional con fer ences’ to 
solve the Pal es tine ques tion all con flict with the doc trine of the Is lamic Re sis-
tance Move ment, for giv ing up any part of the home land is like giv ing up 
part of the re li gious faith it self” (art. 13)4.
The Hamas Char ter also men tions other or gani za tions ac tive in the Pal es tin-
ian ter ri to ries, like the PLO, which is por trayed as a ”fa ther, brother, rela tive or 
friend” as the two move ments have a com mon goal. How ever, in an other sec tion 
of the docu ment, Hamas’ criti cizes the PLO’s secu lar ori en ta tion and its rec og ni-
tion of the State of Is rael5.
For the un der stand ing of Hamas’ radi cal re li gious stance I con sider rele vant 
a pres en ta tion of the or gani za tion’s em blem which en com passes in a vis ual man-
ner most of the or gani za tion’s ideo logi cal prin ci ples. The em blem con sists of a pic-
ture of the mosque the Dome of the Rock. At the top of the em blem is a small map 
of Pal es tine and sur round ing it are two Pal es tin ian flags in a semi cir cu lar shape 
which ap pear as if they are em brac ing the Dome. On the right flag it is writ ten: 
”There is no god but Al lah” and on the left one: ”Mo ham med is the prophet of Al-
lah”. Un der the Dome there are two swords which cross one an other at the dome’s 
base and drift apart form ing a lower frame for the Dome. Un der the pic ture ap-
pears the word ”Pal es tine” and un der it a strip with the phrase ”Is lamic Re sis-
tance Move ment – Hamas”6.
The pic ture of the mosque to gether with the two phrases ex presses the Is-
lamic char ac ter of the move ment. The map in di cated Hamas’ goal of lib er at ing the 
en tire ter ri tory of Pal es tine, while the two swords are sym bols of might and no bil-
ity, two quali ties that are con sid ered es sen tial for all Ar abs7.
Al though the Char ter is im por tant for the un der stand ing of Hamas’ ideo logi-
cal plat form, in the re cent years it ap pears that the or gani za tion’s lead ers have 
started to dis tance them selves from the prin ci ples stated in the docu ment. Hamas’ 
doc trinal dis course has started to di min ish in in ten sity as early as the 1990’s and 
ref er ences to the Char ter are very rarely made in the dis courses made by Hamas 
1 Ibidem.
2 Khaled HROUB, Hamas…cit., p. 273.
3 Ibidem, p. 269.
4 Ibidem, p. 274.
5 Ziad ABU-AMR, ”Hamas…cit.”, p. 13.
6 http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/Hamas1.html (accessed on 21.03.2007).
7 Ibidem.
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lead ers. In time the idea of lib er at ing Pal es tine has be come more im por tant than 
the Is lamic di men sion of the strug gle, situa tion which led schol ars like Khaled 
Hroub to con clude that the con flict with Is rael is started to be per ceived by Hamas 
as due to acts of ag gres sion and not to dif fer ences in re li gious ide ol ogy1. The same 
idea ap pears to be ex pressed by Hamas when one of its lead ers de clared that:
”In prac tice, it [Hamas] does not adopt bel lig er ent po si tions against 
any one on the ba sis of its creed or ide ol ogy. Hamas does adopt a bel lig er ent 
po si tion, how ever, once that creed or ide ol ogy is trans lated into ag gres sive 
or de struc tive ac tions against our umma and na tion”2.
An other proof of a more re al is tic po liti cal ap proach of Hamas is evi dent in 
one of Abu Mar zook state ments con cern ing the in ti fada:
”Hamas never ex pected the in ti fada to lead to the lib era tion of Pal es tine. 
We are aware that fun da men tal his tori cal con di tions must be met for lib era-
tion to oc cur […] The role of the in ti fada was to bring us a few steps closer to 
the sat is fac tion of those con di tions and to speed pro gress to wards the re ali za-
tion of power and re sur gence”3.
Hamas’ ideo logi cal plat form also has im por tant pan-Arab and pan-Is lamic 
ele ments. This is re flected in the way Hamas por trayed the Pal es tin ian cause as 
the fore most cause for Mus lims through out the world be cause of Pal es tine’s 
unique sanc tity and its spe cial status within Is lam4.
All the is sues dis cussed above lead us to the con clu sion that Hamas is a hy brid 
or gani za tion which man ages to com bine in a unique way Islamist ele ments with na-
tion al ist ones. Al though, the higher goal of the or gani za tion, as ex pressed in many 
of Sheikh Yas sin’s dis courses is the foun da tion of a true Is lamic state within the bor-
ders of Pal es tine, there were many oc ca sions when Hamas lead ers seemed to de-
mand more na tion al is tic goals, like the lib era tion of the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries from 
un der the Is raeli oc cu pa tion. The con tra dic tions be tween the or gani za tion’s Islamist 
and na tion al ist goals has long been an is sue of de bate for Hamas’ ideo logues.
Hamas’ ideo logi cal di lemma is just a re flec tion of the ideo logi cal di lemma of the 
en tire Mus lim world which is char ac ter ized by a col lec tive iden tity. Iden tity in the 
Arab world has sev eral com po nents, the most im por tant of which be ing: Is lam and 
Arab na tion al ism. The ele ments are not mu tual ex clu sive, but quite the op po site they 
can be com ple men tary. The im por tance given to one or an other of these ele ments by 
dif fer ent move ments de pends greatly on the his tori cal con text of the mo ment5.
This type of adapt able be hav iour is also ap pli ca ble to Hamas. Al though, 
Hamas was formed as a Islamist re sponse to the secu lar PLO, in time, it started 
also to adopt ele ments of Pal es tin ian na tion al ism in or der to gain popu lar ity 
amidst the Pal es tin ian popu la tion6.
1 Khaled HROUB, Hamas…cit., p. 45.
2 Ibidem.
3 Ibidem, p. 48. 
4 Ibidem.
5 Meir LITVAK, ”The Islamization of Palestinian Identity: The Case of Hamas” at Moshe 
Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies http://www.dayan.org/d&a-hamas-litvak.
htm (accessed on 21.03.2007).
6 Ibidem.
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VIII • no. 4 • 2008
904 AITANA RADU
Signs of this type of mix ture be tween na tion al is tic and Islamist ele ments are 
also no tice able in the Hamas Cove nant. Al though, in the be gin ning of the Char ter, 
Hamas is de scribed as an Is lamic move ment which draws its ”ideas, ter mi nol ogy 
and con cepts” from Is lam, there is also an other part of the Char ter where Hamas 
por trays it self as a ”dis tinc tive Pal es tin ian move ment”, which strives to ”hoist Al-
lah’s flag on every piece of land in Pal es tine”1.
Hamas man ages to rec on cile the na tion al is tic ori en ta tion with the pan-Is-
lamic one by mak ing a clear dif fer ence be tween its short term goal, which is the 
com plete lib era tion of Pal es tine and the es tab lish ment of an Is lamic state in Pal-
es tine and its long term goal of a uni ver sal Is lamic state and the res to ra tion of 
the Ca liph ate. De spite the Pal es tin ian pub lic opin ion’s in crease in scep ti cism re-
lated to pros pects of Is lamic unity, Hamas has pre served this pan-Is lamic ap-
proach, mainly be cause of stra te gic con sid era tions. If the Pal es tin ian strug gle is 
not per ceived as a lo cal con flict but as a true ji had then every Mus lim would be 
re spon si ble for the lib era tion of Pal es tine, and thus Hamas could gain sup port-
ers world wide2.
De spite this in creas ing re-ori en ta tion to wards a more na tion al is tic ap proach, 
there are some schol ars like, Mi chael Levitt, who still be lieve that the main goal of 
Hamas is that of Islam iz ing and radi cal iz ing the Pal es tin ian so ci ety, which is per-
ceived to be one of the most secu lar in the Arab world. The Pal es tin ian so ci ety, due 
to the poor liv ing stan dards and the frus trat ing pres ence of the Is raeli oc cu pa tion 
is vul ner able to such a Islami za tion cam paign3.
The means by which Hamas strug gles to con struct such an Is lamic so ci ety were 
the ones used also by the Mus lim Broth er hood in Egypt: so cial ser vices and edu ca-
tion. In or der to achieve its goal, Hamas uses a wide range of in sti tu tions rang ing 
from Is lamic chari ta ble in sti tu tions and or gani za tions, mosques, classes that teach 
stu dents the Ko ran, za kat com mit tees, medi cal clin ics, re lief so cie ties to or phan-
ages, schools, nurs er ies, cul tural and sports clubs. Hamas man aged to gain the 
trust of the Pal es tini ans, by cre at ing for its in sti tu tions a repu ta tion of hon esty and 
in teg rity unlike the PLO’s in sti tu tions which were fre quently ac cused of in com pe-
tence, nepo tism and oc ca sional mana ge rial or fi nan cial cor rup tion4.
On the other hand, a num ber of schol ars in clud ing the men tioned above Mi-
chael Levitt seem to think that Hamas sus tains these in sti tu tions just in or der to 
have a con stant base of re cruit ment for its op era tives and to en cour age the radi cali-
za tion of the Pal es tin ian so ci ety. There fore, Hamas- run schools, kin der gart ners 
and clubs are seen as places of in doc tri na tion for young minds.
Af ter Hamas won the 2006 elec tions and even be fore that mo ment, when it de-
cided to par tici pate in the elec toral proc ess, many schol ars raised the is sue of 
whether a Hamas gov ern ment would trans form this proc ess of Islami za tion of the 
Pal es tin ian so ci ety into a state pol icy. One such scholar ar gues, how ever, that it is 
not Hamas’ par tici pa tion in the elec tion that fos ters the Islami za tion of the Pal es-
tin ian so ci ety, but the wors en ing so cial con di tions that are the main fac tor for the 
in ten si fi ca tion of this proc ess. Ac cord ing to him:
1 Ibidem. 
2 Ibidem.
3 Matthew LEVITT, Hamas. Political, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad, Yale Univer-
sity Press, New Haven and London, 2006, p. 107.
4 Khaled HROUB, Hamas…cit., p. 235.
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”In a situa tion where or di nary life sup ports the col lapse – when the 
gov ern ment fails, em ploy ment evapo rates, food be comes scarce, and hope is 
aban doned – Islamists of fer a mean ing ful al ter na tive”1.
My aim here was to de con struct two ba sic as sump tions on Is lam that can be 
of ten found in the lit era ture con cern ing the topic of Islamist move ments. The first 
was that Is lam is an in her ently vio lent re lig ion and the sec ond that Is lam is the 
same with Islam ism. By mak ing ref er ences to the Ko ran and the Hadith I have 
proven that vio lence is not natu ral to Is lam as it is not natu ral to Chris ti an ity. Al-
though, the idea of ji had is pre sent in Is lamic po liti cal thought, it is not de fi ni tory 
to the Is lamic re lig ion.
In ad di tion to this I have pre sented the evo lu tion of Is lamic fun da men tal ism, 
lay ing em pha sis on the ele ments that dif fer en ti ate it from Is lamic doc trine. More-
over, in sup port of my the sis I have dis tin guished be tween the dif fer ent schools of 
thought within po liti cal Is lam that are also re flected at the level of Islamist or gani za-
tions. By com par ing the writ ings of the mod er ate Ab duh with those of the radi cal 
Qutb I also made the dif fer ence be tween re for ma tive so cial-edu ca tional move-
ments like the Mus lim Broth er hood and mili tant po liti cal move ments like Hamas.
To con clude, it is my be lief that the suc cess of such large-scale pro jects as the 
”war on ter ror ism” or the pro mo tion of de moc racy in the Mus lim world are 
strongly de pend ent on a bet ter un der stand ing of the con cepts and gen eral phil so-
phy en tailed by po liti cal Is lam.
1 Alastair CROOKE, Beverley MILTON-EDWARDS, ”Elusive Ingredient: Hamas and the 
Peace Process”, Journal of Palestine Studies, no. 132, Summer 2004, pp. 1-11/p. 11.
